University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications

Mental Health Law & Policy

February 2009

Insights from Past Experience with Human
Dynamics in Military Operations
Randy Borum
University of South Florida, wborum@usf.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mhlp_facpub
Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs,
Public Policy and Public Administration Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Borum, Randy, "Insights from Past Experience with Human Dynamics in Military Operations" (2009). Mental Health Law & Policy
Faculty Publications. Paper 561.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/mhlp_facpub/561

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Mental Health Law & Policy at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mental Health Law & Policy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

GLOSSAR Y I

Report of the

Defense Science Board
Task Force on

Understanding
Human Dynamics
February 2009 (DRAFT)

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).
The DSB is a federal advisory committee established to provide
independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions,
conclusions, and recommendations in this report do not necessarily
represent the official position of the Department of Defense.
The DSB Task Force on Understanding Human Dynamics completed
its information gathering in June 2008.
This report is unclassified and cleared for public release

1

2

I GLO SSAR Y

Appendix B. Insights from Past
Experiences with Human Dynamics in
Military Operations
Randy Borum
All military operations have a critical human dimension. Though the
nature, strength, and focus of human dynamics have varied across time
and across conflicts, their presence is undeniable. Human dynamics – as
we have conceptualized them here - comprise the actions and
interactions of personal, interpersonal, and social/contextual factors
and their effects on behavioral outcomes.
Sun Tzu’s ancient strategic admonition to “know your enemy” is
axiomatic in military history, but historically many military leaders have
interpreted this narrowly to mean that they should know (or have good
intelligence preparation about) enemy fighting forces. In discussing
contemporary military transformations, Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy
Simmons have observed that the relevant scope of understanding
should—perhaps must—include also cultural characteristics of the
adversary:
Understanding an adversary requires more than intelligence from
three-letter agencies and satellite photos; it requires an understanding
of their interests, habits, intentions, beliefs, social organizations, and
political symbols—in other words, their culture. An American soldier
can liken culture to a minefield: dangerous ground that, if not
breached, must be navigated with caution, understanding, and
respect. Cultural interpretation, competence, and adaptation are
prerequisites for achieving a win-win relationship in any military
operation. Operational commanders who do not consider the role of
culture during mission planning and execution invite unintended and
unforeseen consequences, and even mission failure.1

1 Basilici, Steven P. & Simmons, Jeremy (June, 2004). Transformation: a bold case for
unconventional warfare. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. p. 6
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For the military commander, however, understanding and mastering
the human dimension of warfare—and Sun Tzu would probably
agree—requires not only understanding these things about an “enemy,”
but also about the entire battlespace.
In his analysis of military leadership in the British Civil Wars,
military historian Stanley D.M. Carpenter emphasizes the importance of
an operation’s “social context” and how this affects, and is affected by,
force of human dynamics:
Human dynamics encompass what Clausewitz called the ‘moral
forces’ and include fear, motivation, passion, the urge to flee, hate,
loyalty, and so on. A successful leader, through his inherent traits and
behaviors, is able to overcome (or at least moderate) the negative
aspects of human dynamics and conversely take advantage of the
positive. In this regard, one can if not overcome, at least mitigate
what Clausewitz popularized as the ‘fog and friction of war’. It allows
him to better manage the inherent chaos and uncertainty of combat.
The societal context plays a large part in a military leader’s success or
failure. It often determines the quality of the instrument and certainly
influences the depth of such human dynamics as motivation, passion,
willingness to sacrifice and so forth. As with the human dynamics, it
is how the commander, through his traits and behavior, manages the
societal context that will determine his effectiveness.2

These pervasive human dynamics can be better understood to
shape tactics and strategy. Indeed, the essence of strategy is to develop
a plan of action that is likely to achieve a specific objective in light of an
opponent’s anticipated response. Anticipating responses - of an enemy,
population, or social institution - has been a central dilemma of every
military leader throughout history.
Some scholars of military strategy and history have suggested that,
for the United States, strategy has been a core weakness. Colin Gray
suggests that “The United States has a persisting strategy deficit.
Americans are very competent at fighting, but they are much less
successful in fighting in such a way that they secure the strategic and,
hence, political, rewards they seek.” It seems that the United States’

2. Carpenter, S. (2005). Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651: The Genius of
This Age. NY: Routledge. at p. 5
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past experiences with human dynamics in military operation illustrates
the maxim that one can “win the battle (perhaps even all the battles)
but lose the war.”
Ideally, strategic competence evolves with experience. According to
Gray, historical examination of past conflicts– of the U.S. and others –
can help to redefine and improve the “American Way of Warfare”; but
he laments, “unfortunately, the first and truest love of the U.S. defense
community is with technology, not with history.” Gray’s comments
about the present parallel Ralph Peters’ future-oriented analysis that
“We need to struggle against our American tendency to focus on
hardware and bean counting to attack the more difficult and subtle
problems posed by human behavior and regional history.”
History may lend its wisdom to understanding the role of human
dynamics in military operations, but it certainly does not offer a menu
of easy answers. Naval historian Geoffrey Till points out, however, that
“The chief utility of history for the analysis of present and future lies in
its ability, not to point out lessons, but to isolate things that need
thinking about. … History provides insights and questions, not
answers.3” In that spirit, the following insights from past experience
are offered for consideration:

1. Cultural Awareness Facilitates Strategic and
Tactical Success
Examples of human dynamics affecting military operations are
abundant – though largely anecdotal- and range from the micro to
macro levels.
At the broadest, strategic level, Robert Jervis4 suggest that lack of
cultural awareness is a major source of misperceptions between
nation/states (particularly as noted in the 1970s, between the United

3. Till, Geoffrey. Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, London: Macmillan, 1982, pp. 224225.
4. Jervis, Robert. “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968),
p 454-479. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1976).
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States and the Soviet Union), and that these misperceived intentions
can have far-reaching consequences. He rejects the more politicallyoriented spiral and deterrence theories as explanations for Cold War
escalations, and instead focuses on “psychological dynamics” as a
source of cognitive bias that, unchecked, will create and sustain
misperceptions. Those misperceptions form the basis for a state’s
decisions and subsequent actions.
Cooper and Telfer have analyzed the cultural impediments to
effective relations and communication between the U.S. and Iran. They
claim that these impediments create an environment that is not
conducive to resolving its mutual, critical problems. They believe “the
tragedy is that relations will deteriorate because the two nations,
through a marked trend of political and strategic misperceptions, will be
operating with false models of the political systems and organization of
the other, leading to a state of confusion exacerbated by mutual
incomprehension of each other’s culture.” 5
At the ground level, among the most common examples for the
U.S. military are foibles and missteps arising from a lack of cultural
awareness. Arcuri (2007) provides a concise description of the problem
and the call for a solution:
Few members of the Armed Forces are familiar with cultural
traditions of the countries in which they operate. Yet violation of
local norms and beliefs can turn a welcoming population into a
hostile mob. Iraqis arrested by U.S. troops have had their heads
forced to the ground -- a position forbidden by Islam except during
prayers. This action offends detainees as well as bystanders. In
Bosnia, American soldiers angered Serbs by greeting them with the
two-fingered peace sign, a gesture commonly used by their Croat
enemies. And the circled-finger “A–OK” signal was a gross insult to
Somalis. The military has enough to worry about without alienating
the local population. It is clear that the Armed Forces lack
sophisticated knowledge of foreign countries. That does not
dishonor their performance; cultural awareness has not been a
mission-essential task—but it should be.

5. Cooper, A. & Telfer, L. (Summer 2006). Misperceptions and Impediments in the US-Iran
Relationship. 49th Parallel: An Interdisciplinary Journal of North American Studies,
Conference Special Edition. P. 27
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These cultural violations seem to have the most significant impact
in operations that require engagement with a host population and that
support stability or humanitarian assistance activity. One insight from
these experiences seems to be the need to define the “battlespace,”
terrain, or area of operation, not just by physical or geographic
boundaries, but also by culture. This means that service members must
not only train to “know the enemy,” but to “know the area.” Most of
Arcuri’s examples are not mistakes in anticipating an enemy maneuver,
they are social/cultural mistakes that carried the potential not only to
anger and embolden the adversary, but also to cultivate broad hostility
among the population toward U.S. presence and personnel. That
hostility could then complicate current mission objectives and future
operational planning.
The examples do illustrate, however, that the effects of cultural
awareness (or lack thereof) can be expected to influence mission
effectiveness even at the most minute and incidental tactical level. This
does not mean that each soldier, sailor, airman, and marine must be an
expert in the area of operation, but basic cultural awareness should be a
fundamental skill for all troops operating in a foreign environment.

2. It is Necessary to Understand and Accept that
Military Operations Have Political Objectives
and Effects
War and politics are inextricably linked. This principle is found in
most theories of warfare and evidence of its truth has been found in
virtually every known military conflict. Clausewitz – the deeply
influential Prussian military theorist – said starkly that “war is a
continuation of politics with other means." Chairman Mao Tse-Tung
commented similarly on the relationship, claiming: “Politics is war
without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.”
While the confluence of politics and war may seem an obvious
point, it is not one that many American policy-makers seem ready to
accept. Jeffrey Record observes that “Permeating the entire fabric of
America’s strategic culture and approach to war, especially the aversion
to fighting for limited political purposes, is an unwillingness to accept
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war as a continuation of politics.” 6 Record further opines that “This
insistence on politically immaculate military operations underpins the
conventional wisdom in the United States regarding the failed
prosecution of the Vietnam War.” When nations oppose nations with
conventional force, the power of political will and popular support
favor the U.S., but when the America becomes involved in “small
wars,” foreign insurgencies, and humanitarian intervention, - what many
see as the future of warfare - the “political” objectives become less
palatable, though operationally essential.
Historically, when a third-party nation has stepped in to help
suppress an insurgency, the “successful” cases nearly always involve
important political concessions (to the insurgents’ interest) by the
indigenous government. Concessions were designed specifically to
address insurgent grievances and offered even when the
counterinsurgency was not favoring the indigenous government. In the
Mau Mau Uprising (1952-1960), for example, concessions were made
for land reform and voting rights. During The Malayan Emergency
(1948-60) the government critically conceded freedom from British
rule, voting rights, and actions to relieve the effects of long-term
bigotry on the ethnic Chinese population.
Making concessions can be difficult to “sell” politically to the
people of an intervening government. These concessions, however,
were not intended as a form of surrender or a sign of weakness, but
rather as an essential way to dry up popular support for the insurgents.
They were apparently effective for that purpose. Because political
factors are so important for the success of military operations, the
population not just the enemy becomes a vital concern.

6. Record, Jeffrey. September 1, 2006. “The American Way of War: Cultural Barriers to
Successful Counterinsurgency,” Cato Institute Paper, no. 577; 1-20. p. 5
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3. Populations Matter As Much As (Sometimes
More Than) Fighting Forces in Determining
Military Success
Historically, during conventional wars there has been a dominant—
in some cases, nearly exclusive—focus on understanding and
countering enemy military forces. What has been lost is the critical
importance of understanding and influencing the population. As the
U.S. has become increasingly involved in “small wars” and various
forms of irregular warfare around the globe, the essential role of a
population in military operations—though known for centuries—has
again come more sharply into view.
In the early 1800s, Napoleon Bonaparte, an imposing conventional
warrior and military strategist, failed to understand—or even seek to
understand—the culture of the battlespace as he preemptively invaded
Spain and Portugal. With ease, his occupying military forces strode into
the region and dethroned the royal family. His victory seemed effortless
and complete.
Napoleon anticipated and conquered the formal state governing
structure, but he failed to learn in advance how little control that
authority held over large segments of its populace. Residents of the
Navarre region, in particular, had become heavily dependent
economically on illicit foreign trade and had a great deal to lose from
the prospect of a new foreign governance. They also were more deeply
bound to the influences of the Catholic Church, than Napoleon
realized. According to Chandler, the confluence of forces cultivated
within the population—foreseeable, but unforeseen—“popular
patriotism, religious fanaticism, and an almost hysterical hatred for the
French7.” That dynamic transformed Napoleon’s graceful occupation
into a protracted eight-year, resource-consuming struggle.
According to Smith: “The strategic gap that developed between
Napoleon’s rapid conventional military victory and the immediate

7. Chandler, David G. (1966). The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: Simon and Schuster, p.
659.
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requirement to influence positively the population as part of posthostilities stabilization operations highlights the limits of conventional
military power in post-conflict operations and the perils of forgetting
“the people” in the initial and ongoing strategic calculus. Unfortunately,
nations and militaries around the globe have been forced to relearn that
lesson many times in the ensuing 200 years.”8
Accounting, as Smith says, for “the people” in initial and ongoing
strategic planning requires understanding and anticipating their role
both in resistance and in resolution. One of the longstanding maxims of
counterinsurgency strategy is to separate the population from the
insurgents. This is done to increase physical and informational control;
to stem the tide of insurgent growth and recruitment by denying them
access; to permit kinetic action against insurgents that occurs “out of
view” of the populace and reduces risk of collateral injuries; and to
increase the population’s sense of security, at least within their “safe
zones.” Andrew F. Krepinevich suggests that neglecting this separation
principle was a major downfall in the United States’ military action in
Vietnam. He concludes that superior U.S. firepower facilitated massive
Viet Cong attrition, but “it never denied the enemy his source of
strength - access to the people.”9
When insurgents have easy access to, and are hopelessly co-mingled
with, the population, it is easier for them to control the “narrative” of
what is happening. When the insurgent view becomes ground truth for
the population, the resistance not only gains new fighters, but just as
importantly, it gains a broader base of sympathizers. A population of
sympathizers is perhaps the most powerful force multiplier for
insurgents.
During World War II, as part of the People's Liberation War of
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslavian Partisans enjoyed tremendous growth and
success (culminating in over three quarters of a million fighting

8. Smith, George. 2004. Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural
Intelligence. CJCS Strategy Essay Competition. Washington D.C: National Defense University
Press. P. 22
9. Krepinevich, Andrew (1986). The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
Press. P. 197.
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troops)—according to an embedded former OSS officer Franklin
Lindsay—largely as a function of a friendly population. Franklin says of
the populace that “Their support was crucial to success. They provided
the intelligence screens that surrounded and protected the armed
Partisans, as well as the food and clothing, the shelter and the recruits,
without which the Partisans could not survive10.” T.E Lawrence
similarly noted that “Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a
striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic.”11

4. Continuity of Knowledge on Human
Dynamics is Essential, Particularly in
Joint/Coalition and Protracted Operations.
During the U.S. “RESTORE HOPE” operations in Somalia (UN
Operation in Somalia, UNOSUM I), the first Joint Force Commander
recognized the grave operational implications of the region’s “clan
warfare” culture and tasked the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force to
monitor not only adversary intent, but also the “disposition” of the
population. A Joint Universal “lessons learned” analysis says of the
Somalis that “their culture stresses the idea of ‘me and my clan against
all outsiders,’ with alliances between clans being only temporary
conveniences. Guns and aggressiveness, including the willingness to
accept casualties, are intrinsic parts of this culture, with women and
children considered part of the clan’s order of battle.”12
These issues proved to be vital for operational planning.
Unfortunately, the cultural lessons devolved over time and across
changes in personnel to the extent that “during UNOSOM II, US
leaders failed to take certain factors of Somali culture into
consideration, contributing to the operation’s failure.”13 As Kent

10. Lindsay, Franklin (1993). Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisan's in Wartime
Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p. 198.
11. Quoted in Laqueur, W. (Ed.). (2004). Voices of terror: Manifestos, writings and manuals of Al
Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorists from around the world and throughout the ages. New York: Reed Press.
12. Allard, Kenneth (1995). Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington DC: National
Defense University Press. p. 13.
13. U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 16 September 2002), III-10.
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Strader observes: “Somewhere in the transfer of authority (TOA)
between UNOSUM I and II knowledge was lost or ignored.” 14
The “lessons learned” analysis concludes that “The Somalia
experience underlines the importance of knowing the country, the
culture, the ground, and the language as a pre-condition for military
operations15,” but an embedded insight is that continuity of knowledge
is important. Senior command certainly must understand the cultural
and other human dynamics of the battlespace, but the responsibility for
this knowledge cannot be relegated solely to the operational
Commander16. As experiences in Iraq show, even brigade-level leaders
must ensure that human dynamics intelligence has continuity through
the transfer of authority. Brigades and their units frequently experience
deployment rotations or geographic displacements. What is learned
about the battlespace in one area or on one deployment may not apply
when the same unit moves just thirty miles away. It is critical that areaspecific knowledge not only be collected and used, but also shared and
preserved through changes in personnel.

5. Human Dynamics Are Fluid and Often
Variable Across and Within Conflicts or
Operations
Past experiences suggest that human dynamics largely shape the
disposition of a population and the character of conflict. In his book,
Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, John Lynn argues that all warfare
is, and has been, culture-specific. He suggests that since Ancient Greek
times, dynamics of human values, expectations and preconceptions–
cultural (a term he uses to refer to a complex that is somewhat more
idiosyncratic than nomothetic) dynamics in particular – have been the

14. Strader, O. Kent (2006). Culture: The New Key Terrain - Integrating Cultural Competence
into JIPB. School of Advanced Military Studies , United States Army Command and General
Staff College , Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. p. 27
15. Ibid, p. 95
16. Gordon, James A. (2004). Cultural Assessments and Campaign Planning: A Monograph. School of
Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas.
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principal driver of whether and how nations have engaged in armed
conflict.17 While Lynn’s argument is somewhat polemic, he provides
extensive examples to support his view from conflicts and eras
throughout military history. He concludes that human dynamics
influences have been not only robust in warfare, but that the dynamics
and their effects varied with the culture of the conflict’s participants.
In his landmark analysis of the Vietnam War, Douglas Pike reaches
a similar conclusion: that unconventional warfare does not lend itself
to a grand theory. Each conflict or operation possesses a unique set of
causes and sustaining or driving factors. One size – or one
understanding - does not fit all. Pike concludes that “Unconventional
wars grow because of the peculiar political soil of individual cultures18.”
If this is true, then according to Kent Strader, a key to success for the
operational commander will be “to unravel the cause of conflict and
attack its origins with non-kinetic tools and to a lesser degree its
soldiers.19
Past military experience does not indicate that no human dynamics
are persistent or enduring, only that many are unique and/or variable
both across and even within a given operation. It is reasonable to infer
that certain core dynamics are recurrent across most conflicts.
However, even the core dynamics, which are relatively stable, are
transformative. That is, the core dynamic may persist, but its
manifestations may be different depending on contextual influences,
and they change over the developmental course of the operation.
One of the predominant core dynamics influencing a population is
its perceived safety and security. Perhaps this principle is not surprising.
It has been a cornerstone of behavioral theories of motivation for more
than half a century. Nearly every college student has been exposed to

17. Lynn, John (2003). Battle: A History of Combat and Culture from Ancient Greece to
Modern America. New York: Westview Press.
18. Pike, Douglas (1986). PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam, Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
p. 54.
19. Strader, O. Kent (2006). Culture: The New Key Terrain - Integrating Cultural Competence
into JIPB. School of Advanced Military Studies , United States Army Command and General
Staff College , Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. p. 25
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Abraham Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs,” in which safety/security is
just one motivational notch above a human’s physiological needs for
food, sleep, etc20. In nearly all known military operations, securing the
population’s sense of safety has been a necessary (though not always
sufficient) condition for any successful campaign to win its “hearts and
minds.” People feel safer living in an environment that they perceive as
orderly, predictable, and fair. When an occupying military can provide
that environment for the population, the loyalty of the people often
follows. Without it, however, it has faltered.
Though a population’s sense of security is a robust contributor to
operational success, its manifestations are transformative, and therefore,
fluid. In past military conflicts, the nature and object of safety concerns
has evolved over time. A population may begin by fearing threats from
a repressive government, but over time becomes more concerned about
protection against accidental and intentional harm from insurgents who
are resisting an occupying force. Likewise, in human terrain relief
operations and stability operations, safety needs may shift from an
initial focus on protection against tribal or sectarian violence to
protection against disease and health concerns—or vice versa. The
same “dynamic” or need is manifested in a different form and may
require a different military response. That even the “stable” dynamics
are fluid means—consistent with the “continuity” insight—that
monitoring the disposition of the population must be ongoing and
continuous.
Finally, it is striking how the influence of human dynamics in
military operations can vary widely even within a given conflict or within
the battlespace. This insight has been dramatically evident throughout
recent U.S. experiences in Iraq. David Kilcullen – the U.S.’s senior
counterinsurgency strategy advisor – based on personal experiences and
observation notes that “Knowledge of Iraq is very time-specific and
location-specific….Hence, observations from one time/place may or
may not be applicable elsewhere, even in the same campaign in the
same year: we must first understand the essentials of the environment,

20. Maslow, A.H. (1943). A Theory of Human Motivation, Psychological Review 50, 370-96.
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then determine whether analogous situations exist, before attempting to
apply “lessons.”21
This has serious implications for the depth and frequency of
intelligence assessments, within-theatre information sharing, and the
aforementioned continuity and transfer of knowledge.

21. Kilcullen, David (2007). Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice, 2007.

